During a five-hour hearing of the Senate Banking Committee Sept. 24,
Paulson said it is "difficult to determine" the ultimate cost of the
plan, though he said the hope is to minimize the cost to taxpayers.
Enactment requires lifting the legal ceiling on the federal debt to a
record $11.3 trillion, from the current $10.6 trillion.
Congress, under the gun to pass a bill as close to last week's
scheduled Sept. 26 adjournment as possible, certainly hasn't taken time
to consider other ideas. And believe it or not, there are other ideas.
Several economists and market experts have offered alternatives, and a
handful of lawmakers incorporated some of their ideas into bills that
were meant to compete with Paulson's. They were quickly pushed aside in
the rush to grapple with the Bush administration's plan. The most
prevalent suggestions from the academics involve calls to force debt
holders to forgive some portion of financial institutions' obligations,
for the federal government to inject capital into failing institutions
in return for preferred stock or for raising matching private-sector
investment. Other suggestions include eliminating mark-to-market
accounting requirements to release the vise squeezing many companies.
The rival plans were dropped under the pressure of Paulson's
relentless lobbying and dire warnings from Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Ben Bernanke, who told lawmakers small business owners,
automakers and middle-income Americans would soon experience a credit
squeeze if the government didn't act quickly.
Questioned by Rep. Deborah Pryce, R-Ohio, Paulson and Bernanke
dismissed the list of alternatives as outmoded solutions better suited
to less-complicated crises of the past.
"There are a number of tactical suggestions people are dealing with
-- accounting ideas, the mortgage cramdown in bankruptcy," he told her.
They are the "opposite of what we want to do," he said. "We want to
encourage lenders to lend for mortgages."
Injecting government capital "is the Japanese solution," which
failed to pull that country out of its decade-long funk in the 1990s,
Paulson argued. "They were in a very long recession for many years.
They put capital in the banks, and then the government essentially was
in many ways running them. We are trying to take a different approach."
Instead, Treasury aims to establish a market that will facilitate
price discovery on illiquid, complex financial instruments. "That will
encourage private capital to follow and makes it possible for banks to
recapitalize themselves," Paulson said.
Bernanke said the competing suggestions would work better for failed
institutions with traditional assets such as loans. "It's a very
different situation from past episodes," he told lawmakers. Right now,
the banking system as a whole is functioning, but investors won't
inject capital because they have no idea what the shaky assets are
worth. "More broadly, the problem is the complexity of these securities
and the difficulty of the evaluation. Nobody knows what the banks are
worth. Therefore it's difficult for private capital to come in and
create more balance sheet capacity so the banks can make loans."
Bernanke stressed that there's nothing preventing Washington from
trying alternatives if the asset purchase program doesn't get credit
flowing again. "I would advise the [treasury] secretary to be flexible
and respond to conditions as they change. If this process is not
working properly, there are other ways to use the money to purchase
assets or purchase capital and support the banking system."
If it comes to that, there's no shortage of experts ready with
different ideas. Charles Calomiris, Henry Kaufman professor of
financial institutions at Columbia University's School of Business and
a member of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, has called for
government injections of preferred stock into faltering financial
institutions. Modeled after the Depression-era Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, it would avoid the complications of pricing subprime
instruments for purchase. Calomiris and others have warned that
Paulson's approach risks setting prices either too low, thus denying
selling institutions needed capital, or too high, which would harm
taxpayers.
Preferred stock assistance would limit taxpayers' loss exposure, he
says, and leave the task of managing assets to the market. Supporters
of the idea point out that is essentially the approach taken with Bear
Stearns Cos. and American International Group Inc.
Douglas Elmendorf, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and
a former senior economist at the White House Council of Economic
Advisers and senior official at the Treasury Department and Federal
Reserve Board, has offered a couple of different approaches. One would
have the government make equity investments in a wide cross-section of
financial institutions. That approach would also avoid having the
government guess the appropriate prices and quantities of individual
mortgage-related securities, and, he says, it would not end up
providing outsized awards to companies that made the worst investments.
It also has the benefit of offering taxpayers a chance to earn a higher
return if the financial system has a strong recovery.
The Center for American Progress argues that the government should
tackle what it calls the root cause of the problem: the glut of
foreclosed properties across the country. The group has proposed
establishing a fund, which it dubs the Great American Dream
Neighborhood Stabilization, or Gardns, Fund, to help municipalities or
local nonprofits purchase foreclosed properties and offer them for sale
to qualified low- and moderate-income families on affordable terms.
Proceeds from the sale would be used to purchase additional properties,
thus multiplying the fund's purchasing power.
Jack M. Guttentag, professor of finance emeritus at the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania and founder of mortgage
technology company GHR Systems Inc., urges a loan program that
would provide cash to firms with acceptable collateral. The program
could be administered by the Federal Home Loan Bank System, which would
act as reserve banks for mortgage lenders. He notes they have the
benefit of established systems for valuing and monitoring mortgage
collateral. Although Federal Home Loan Banks currently lend only to
members of the system, he says participation in this program could be
extended to any institution -- even hedge funds and foreign firms -- that
post acceptable collateral.
To discourage program participants from relending at a profit, the
government would charge an interest rate high enough to make it
impossible. In fact, he says, the government would make the profit
because the loan rates would substantially exceed the government's cost
of funds. Profits generated by the higher rates could be funneled into
the federal Hope Program for modifying distressed mortgages or similar
programs.
Amid all the talk of financial Armageddon, there are also those who
say no bailout is necessary. Liberal economist James K. Galbraith
pointed out in The Washington Post on Sept. 25 that all five major
investment banks have either gone bust or transformed into commercial
banks, and those are eligible to hold federally insured deposits. "The
point of the bailout is to buy assets that are illiquid but not
worthless," he wrote. "But regular banks hold assets like that all the
time. They're called 'loans.' " Now that the remaining institutions are
commercial banks, he suggests outflow of capital can be stemmed by
eliminating the "pointless" $100,000 cap on deposit insurance provided
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. With investors' minds at
ease, the FDIC will have time to burrow into the institutions' loan
portfolios. At those declared solvent, "money market funds would flow
in." The FDIC could shore up insolvent ones with its bridge bank
facility.
As for the $700 billion Paulson wants, Galbraith has ideas for that
too. To boost confidence in the FDIC, he suggests injecting the deposit
insurance fund with a half-trillion dollars. The Treasury could keep
$200 billion in reserve so it can recapitalize banks if necessary by
buying preferred shares. With the systemic threat removed, Washington
could then shift its attention to a multiyear effort to repair the
housing market and invest in local infrastructure and renewable energy.
The various suggestions influenced several legislative alternatives,
but the sponsors ditched them almost immediately once it became clear
that Paulson's plan would be where the action is.
New York's Sen. Charles Schumer led off with a rival bill that uses
a different model than Paulson's. Schumer's plan, unveiled Sept. 18,
was adapted from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation model endorsed
by Calomiris. An RFC-style government agency would provide capital to
struggling financial institutions in exchange for an equity or
preferred-stock stake in the banks. It also would require participating
institutions to accept loan modifications by bankruptcy judges.
Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., on
Sept. 22 introduced a bill that would grant the Treasury authority to
buy distressed assets but also would require the agency to take a
portion of any profits it earns from their sale and put them into the
Hope affordable housing program. He also includes authority for
bankruptcy judges to restructure mortgages for homeowners facing
foreclosure. Dodd and Schumer didn't focus on their legislation but
pushed the White House to include mortgage-workout provisions and other
add-ons in its bill.
Like many conservative Republicans, Rep. Thaddeus McCotter is
adamantly opposed to Paulson's bailout. The Michigan lawmaker is
chairman of the Republican House Policy Committee, a leadership
advisory group. McCotter is also a member of the House Financial
Services Committee. His bill, dubbed Earn for Expedited American
Recapitalization -- Now act, would make available to financial
institutions a prepackaged recapitalization proceeding in which debt
forgiveness is a component. Investments in troubled assets or financial
institutions that undergo an Earn proceeding are eligible for a zero
capital gains tax rate for the life of the investment. If no private
capital is forthcoming, the government can take a preferred equity
stake in an Earn financial institution. No dividends may be paid to any
other investor until the taxpayers' claim is redeemed with
"appropriate" interest. The government will also hold voting rights in
an Earn financial institution proportional to its equity shares owned.
McCotter notes that voting rights allows the government to have a voice
in CEO compensation without eliminating boards of directors' authority
to set pay. To assist distressed homeowners, 5% of any government
infusion must be used to reduce the face value of "toxic" mortgages.
For troubled assets, his bill would suspend the current mark-to-market
rule and replace it with a three-year rolling average mark-to-market;
and for a fee, insurance on these assets could be purchased from the
federal government.
Sen. Hillary Clinton, D-N.Y., on Sept. 23 laid out "next steps" for
dealing with the crisis. She is calling for the creation of a new Home
Owner's Loan Corporation, or Holc, modeled after another Depression-era
agency, to carry out mortgage modifications. She warns that 2 million
homeowners carry mortgages greater than the current market value of
their homes. Modification would give the homeowners new fixed-rate
mortgages with payments they can afford. Clinton also wants a temporary
moratorium on foreclosures and a temporary freeze on rate hikes for
adjustable-rate loans. She is also calling for implementation of a
Federal Housing Administration refinancing initiative passed into law
this summer. She favors an equity component for the government as part
of the initial bailout package and wants prices of mortgage securities
bought by taxpayers to be disclosed in real time in order to prevent
the program from being abused.
Given the likelihood that the administration would get the bulk of
what it wanted, such proposals may be the starting point for the next
wave of attempts to resolve the crisis.
Comments
Some interesting ideas except for DODD & SCHUMER. Those two putzes got us where we are today. Now when we have to bail out AMERICA from their failed programs (sub-prime lending to unqualified home buyers and taking kick-backs from Fannie & Freddie - along with Obama) now they want us to give proceeds from future mortgage sales to the HOPE housing foundation that Dodd and Obama are direct beneficiaries of instead of - DIRECTLY TO RETIRE DEBT.
This from the man who chairs the commision that interviewd Paulson and Bernanke to evaluate the Bush/Paulson/Bernanke proposal.
How about offering as incentive to investors - ELIMINATE CAPITAL GAINS TAX for all companies that buy these sub-prime mortgages on the condition that they are CONVERTED TO THE 30 YR FIXED NOTES AT THE CURRENT RATE, and as an additional incentive - REDUCE CORPORATE TAX RATE FROM 35% TO 25% FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS THAT BUY MORE THAN $5 BILLION OF THESE MORTGAGES....
....offer to back loans at 50% OF VALUE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS and finally, remove any golden parachutes from comp plans of executives that participate in these programs until all assets are re-sold, FINALLY - participating financial institutions will pay a 10% tax on profits from the re-sale of these sub-prime mortgages.
This would effectively, relieve the burden substantially from the tax payers and provide incentive for healthy financial institions to grow systemically on all investments and by removing TAX PENALTIES in place now for bearing the risk with the taxpayer and our government.
CAPITALISM / INCENTIVE / SHARED RISK / REWARD