Maybe we should revisit the case of Sandy Weill. For the past few years, Weill, the now-retired and very wealthy Wall Street dealmaker, had been dismissed and derided. His greatest creation, Citigroup Inc., was awash in bad mortgages and losses, and the strategic concept Citigroup embodied, universal banking, was rejected as unwieldy, unmanageable, the result of a kind of dealmaking hubris gone mad.
Of course, that was before Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., in the mere flash of the eye, plunged into bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch & Co. was acquired by Bank of America Corp., and the Federal Reserve saved American International Group Inc.
But it's not just that Weill's favorite idea had come startlingly back in favor (whether it's a good idea for the ages remains debatable). It's also the fact that Weill's unusual blend of M&A derring-do, obsessive cost-cutting and operating caution -- a style practiced by former protégé Jamie Dimon, CEO of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. -- suddenly seems prudent, if not wise. Who can tell whether Weill would have piled into mortgages as excessively as his now-fired successor, Charles Prince? But on a Wall Street gripped by the siren call of leverage and liquidity, Weill was always an outlier, opting to restrain leverage and seek greater size and diversity -- the source of the now famous, or infamous, financial supermarket.
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In this market, Weill looks seerlike again. Size is viewed as
essential to survival, universal banking is the rage and, apparently,
if the Federal Reserve has anything to do with it, reduced leverage and
smaller bank-type profits will prevail.
We are living through strange, transformational times when up is
down, left is right. A Republican administration finds itself forced to
pile up financial assets like a nationalizing potentate run amok. On
Wall Street, where deregulated markets are the very dogma of life,
firms, urged on by a theoretically independent Fed (which seems to take
instructions from Treasury's Henry Paulson), have in their desperation
banded together in a kind of socialist brotherhood to save what they
can, recreating a pre-1930s banking sector. The collapse of Bear
Stearns Cos. was shocking but "explained" in the press by the wayward
psychology of Jimmy Cayne. Such an explanation didn't fly at Lehman,
which plunged into mortgages and proved too small to survive. But the
rapidity with which Merrill Lynch sought out Bank of America, erasing
the third of the five "independent" Wall Street firms, shocked even the
most hardened of observers. And then there was AIG.
But step back. In truth, the weekend Lehman died represented the
final end of the long battle between commercial and investment banks
that had its origins in the Great Depression and saw its sharpest
conflicts in the '90s. For years, investment banks seemed to more than
hold their own; certainly, investment bankers had it all over
commercial bankers in terms of prestige, pay, tailoring. The attraction
to investment banking was embodied by commercial bank J.P. Morgan &
Co.'s desperate drive to turn itself into one. But in the end, size,
capital and diversification -- Weill's mantra -- seems to have triumphed.
J.P. Morgan disappeared into the maw of Chase Manhattan in 2000. Now
only Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Morgan Stanley survive, and, as of press time, that was an open question.
In retrospect, it had been clear since the late '90s that the
independents were losing ground to the big banks, all of which had made
significant acquisitions of investment banks. Citi, J.P. Morgan Chase, UBS, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG
made runs up the league tables, despite their sporadic integration or
operating woes. In particular, the big banks used their balance sheets
and financing clout to elbow into deals. The independents scrambled to
keep up, expanding their capital base and piling into higher
risk-reward business, like principal investing, trading or
securitization. That evolution, fueled by free-flowing liquidity and
leverage, gave these firms the reputation, not undeserved, of acting
like hedge funds. In fact, they might well have piled too much risk and
too much leverage atop too little capital, all to feed escalating
compensation demands from within and public equity market demands for
growth from without.
These firms found themselves in a squeeze. Beneath them grew a
tangle of hedge funds, private equity shops and hybrids. On top loomed
the big banks. Wall Street had always struggled as profitable product
lines commoditized under the pressure of competition. But now that
cycle accelerated as firms, many private and amply fueled by
institutional money, arbitraged away profits, driving public firms out
on the risk curve. Talent was also drawn to hedge and buyout funds. In
this context, the dominance of a firm like Goldman Sachs was even more
remarkable. But the rest of the independents, and a number of banks,
were drawn so deeply into the highly profitable mortgage game that they
couldn't escape when the tide turned.
The Washington regulatory system was slow to adjust to the changing
realities; that's been obvious for a while but a burning crisis only in
the past year or so. Now the New Deal regulatory scheme looks as
bankrupt as Lehman, with once-powerful agencies like the Securities and
Exchange Commission wandering about in search of a mission or a
meeting. Time and again, crisis after crisis, Treasury and the Fed
teamed up to try to manage the spreading disaster. Lehman got the
brushoff, but the feds stepped in to save AIG, putting the Fed and
Treasury itself in a fiscal bind.
What is apparent is that every crisis has spawned new sets of
unintended consequences. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bailouts seemed
to have brought an end to the feds' appetite for what the newspapers
piously refer to as "taxpayer" money. But by then the crisis had its
own self-generated momentum. The bailout of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. and the Federal National Mortgage Association
may have released shorts to renew their attacks on Lehman, particularly
hedge funds that lacked other, more promising strategies, or simply
frightened institutions. When Lehman failed, and Merrill jumped into
BofA's arms, selling pressures, now well beyond the shorts, swung
toward AIG, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Other targets, notably Washington Mutual Inc.,
loom. The market has seemingly decided that Wall Street's independent
firms, with their need to finance themselves in the short-term markets,
had to go, gas guzzlers in a world suddenly, inexplicably, without oil.
Still, before one leaps to any glib conclusion about the demise of
Wall Street, consider a few things. Wall Street is a set of functions
as much as a collection of institutions. The markets will not
disappear, or even shrink very much. Advisory, research, underwriting,
market operations, initial public offerings will still need to be
supplied to a large, lively and lucrative corporate sector. The talent
exists to fulfill these needs; the question is where will they work?
And just because the whirlwind has knocked down some storied
institutions, there is no guarantee that the desire to bet high risk
for high reward has disappeared. Not only are there many Wall Streeters
who remain eager to play that game, there is a proliferating base of
institutions, here and abroad, eager to pay for performance. The
speculative impulse has also not expired -- it's not even hiding; that
impulse still drives change. And so the mantra (which may not be very
popular on Main Street) in these anxious days should be: Wall Street is
dead. Long live Wall Street.
Comments
A year later and your right the markets are still here and going. Long live Wall Street!