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What we know about the debt ceiling

by Robert Teitelman  |  Published July 28, 2011 at 12:29 PM
storm125x100.jpgHere are all the things about the debt ceiling we do not know. Nearly everything. If ever there was an episode that confirms our inability to predict the future, or comprehend the present, this is it. We have little idea what will happen in the House, or in the Senate, or in the House and Senate when -- or if -- they come together to achieve that elusive miracle, reconciliation, or at the White House, or at the ratings agencies, or in the markets, or in the real economy, or in the world. The brave talk about how this won't matter (Felix Salmon and Tyler Cowen discuss this here and here) or the imminence of the apocalypse are guesses, inspired or not, self-interested or not, smart or not. We have been wrong all along, over and over and over. Our very "wrongness" has created a downward spiral: If nothing is "real," if experts are wrong, then we are compelled, by God or by voters of some remote district or from deep personal need, to fill in the gaps, to lean on the few solid things we do know, like household finances, Arthur Laffer or Ayn Rand; and reality slips its anchor and drifts away. We are heading into this dangerously unknown territory much as we blundered into Iraq: claiming deep knowledge yet knowing absolutely zilch. (Well, we had maps.) Heavily armored fools on a crusade. The numbers cobbled together on savings are mere fictions, given the size of the economy and all the contingent factors that pile up into the future. Tax revenues are slightly more predictable, because they're short term; but as Chris Giles points out in the Financial Times today, the supply-side belief that tax cutting will generate compensatory economic growth, meaning jobs, remains voodoo economics, with no proof that it has ever really occurred. The belief, remarkably based on trying to read the opaque mind of the markets, that the economy sits perilously close to some fiscal cliff, that we are "broke," ignores what facts we do possess, as Simon Johnson points out in a post today: The real budget crunch is a decade or more ahead. The American economy, despite the jobless rate, is far better positioned than, say, Europe. Is there a growing fiscal problem? Certainly. But there is plenty of time, except for those who believe deep in their hearts that there is not. What we suffer from is an advanced case of cataclysmism (in which we both see visions of disaster and furtively wish it will occur) that in the end is both infantile and moronic. Students for generations have shaken their heads over the absurdity of the seemingly endless war over silver and gold in the late 19th century. Now that looks like some graduate seminar.
 
But again: What can we know? All we can really know is that we are playing with probabilities, and the odds, like the debt, are mounting. We are piling on risk, in a variety of directions: fiscal, monetary, economic, geopolitical, historical. The consequences of 2008 are already proliferating in unpredictable ways. Both the euro-zone crisis and this political-economic stalemate in the U.S. did not have their origins in the crisis, but it did drive their metastatic growth. Perhaps this entire crisis is overblown. Perhaps the debt ceiling will be raised over the weekend. Perhaps, if it's not, the effects will be minimal. Perhaps the difference between AAA and AA are tiny. Perhaps interest rates will bump up, then recede. Perhaps, in another idiotic metaphor, this crisis will lance the boil of political dysfunction, just like fighting in Iraq would drain the swamp of terrorism. Perhaps. Perhaps not. These are lots of perhapses, each of which contains a slug of risk we not only cannot measure accurately, but that we can't even foresee or perhaps imagine; the perhapses are vectors of risk that cross, recombine, branch, gather in toxic pools. Sort of like credit default swaps.
 
Want to try another metaphor? Why the hell not. Congress now resembles the banks doubling up on mortgage risk as the mortgage markets softened. The financial crisis stirred a variety of acute questions in retrospect, not least from the avenging fingerwavers of Congress. What were they thinking? Were those bankers stupid, venal or criminal? How could they put so many innocent souls at risk for a gut feel, a desperate toss of the dice, an act of self-interest or of greed or ego? What kind of monsters are they? Of course, the banks were private institutions with public responsibilities. We never voted bankers into office. But we voted for Congress. And so the accountability, as always in a democracy, redounds upon all of us. There's no escape, unless you adopt a new country. That's a fact. - Robert Teitelman
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Tags: Arthur Laffer | Ayn Rand | Chris Giles | debt ceiling | Felix Salmon | Simon Johnson | Tyler Cowen
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