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Why reviving manufacturing is so difficult

by Robert Teitelman  |  Published January 7, 2011 at 1:43 PM
manufacture125X100.jpgThe Financial Times on Friday tackles a problem that is as tangled and difficult as it is encased in myth and nostalgia: American manufacturing. (Our own Matt Miller has written extensively on this subject in The Deal magazine, see here and here.) The paper does a good job explaining why you just can't flip a switch and get factories humming again -- even if you could convince thousands of newly minted M.B.A.'s to eschew the riches of consulting and Wall Street for wire-hanger makers in the depths of the Midwest. You come to the end of this analysis and you're left with a couple of thoughts: There's certainly more that the government -- and that's what these pieces always unavoidably come down to -- can do to make the life of manufacturers in the U.S. easier, from targeted subsidies, tax breaks and tariffs to more aggressive attempts to establish trade agreements to weakening the dollar. But every one of these items has trade-offs, which grow ever larger, and more damaging, as they scale up. And it requires great delicacy and sophistication to pull them off.  And even if you do succeed, you'll probably be improving the situation only on the margins. In a large, mature, advanced economy like the U.S., which has evolved into a powerful consumer and service economy, reviving manufacturing -- improving on its 8% of American workers and 11% of GDP -- is a huge task. In the FT, Leo Hindery, the former head of AT&T Broadband among many other top media jobs, now at the New American Foundation, argues that the manufacturing sector should employ "at least 20% and more like 25% [of workers] to sustain the economy and avoid "consumer-credit driven bubbles." Hindery's off-the-cuff estimates are fairly typical, if vaporous. First, such a shift would require a massive economic adjustment: a drastically lower dollar, a huge reallocation of capital and no guarantee of either competitiveness or growth (perhaps the most interesting part of the FT analysis involves the discussion of where manufacturing jobs will be located in a global economy: Not here, say executives, and not to generate exports, but in emerging markets themselves). Second, a larger manufacturing sector would not necessarily reduce consumer-driven bubbles; workers, after all, are also consumers. You dampen consumer-driven bubbles by choking off consumer credit. Third, where do these numbers come from? Are they based on some historic period when American manufacturing was robust and the middle class intact, like the '50s and '60s? If that's the case, Hindery falls for the retrospective fallacy, which is a virulent, if common form, of nostalgia. Or is it based on countries like Germany that have strong industrial-based export economies? If that's the case, the problem is the same: The U.S. economy of 2010 is very different from Germany, just as it is very different from the economy of 1955.
 
We've seen such nostalgia before, with the century-long retreat of agriculture before the advances of industry. We retain the relics of that inevitably losing struggle in the form of agricultural subsidies and set-asides (look at ethanol policy). There is, to this day, a decent trade argument for protecting American agriculture. But the real intellectual engine of agricultural protectionism is the ideology of the family farm, with its Jeffersonian overtones and its identity with core American values. The fact that most of the commercial subsidies go for agribusinesses tends to get buried. In the nostalgia over agriculture, American values are associated with the soil, fertility and growth, and the belief (completely spurious) of yeoman self-sufficiency. This is an 18th-century fantasy. In industry, the nostalgia resides in the belief that making things -- forging metal, twisting steel, producing tangible goods -- has greater virtue than the manipulation of symbols: homo faber, man the maker. This is a 19th-century fantasy. A sub-issue: the nostalgia for the solidarity and middle-class incomes once associated with industrial unionism, which remains powerful and, of course, politically potent.
 
Now in the real world these skills -- farming, manufacturing, a post-industrial knowledge economy -- tend to be considerably more mixed up. Modern manufacturing requires sophisticated engineering and production skills, which demands a mastery of abstraction and technical knowledge (so does agriculture for that matter) not all that different from what occurs in Silicon Valley or Wall Street. Those kinds of skills can only be learned, which takes us to the fundamental -- and very difficult -- question underlying all these issues: education and training. It's true. As American manufacturing jobs head overseas (well, they don't "head," they disappear and are replaced by foreign workers), we lose complex and specialized communities of knowledge and skills. But our educational system doesn't help. Schools have steadily dis-invested in the kind of vocational training that once prepared industrial workers. And, for any number of reasons -- good and bad -- the best American students avoid certain kinds of engineering disciplines, which as technology has advanced, grow ever more complex. If no one wants a factory in their back yard, few urge their children to tackle the rigors of advanced manufacturing either. You can't change that by simply hammering down salaries on Wall Street. Reforming education, altering the ambitions of parents and children, is, to say the least, very hard and very long term.
 
Again, all that's not to say that policies can't improve the lot of manufacturing, and of workers, just that it's not about to bring the '50s back. Part of the price for having the largest, most advanced (and our surviving manufacturing sector remains world class), most complex economy is that solutions to large problems like manufacturing are extremely long term, painfully difficult, particularly political and probably only marginally effective. This is a democracy. Every trade-off has its interest groups arrayed behind it. Every interest group has its arguments, its virtues and its lobbyists. The law of large numbers has many manifestations, including inertia. This makes for an incredibly messy politics and for a sense that little can be done. The price of an advanced economy -- and emerging nations from China to India to Brazil will eventually discover this -- is that maturity paradoxically produces a loss of flexibility and self-determination. We talk transformation far more than we ever attempt it. We are increasingly a captive of the trend. - Robert Teitelman
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